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Note
LOVABLE PIRATES?
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BATTLE BETWEEN
ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND WHALERS IN THE SOUTHERN OCEAN
AMANDA M. CAPRARI
The International Whaling Commission has banned commercial
whaling by member nations since 1986. Although a member of this
Commission, Japan has continued its whaling practices under the guise of
scientific research, hunting hundreds of whales every season in the
Antarctic waters. The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, a radical
environmentalist group, has declared war on the Japanese whaling fleet
and mounted a campaign to attack the Japanese whaling fleet using nonlethal tactics. The environmentalists and whalers are now locked in a
bitter battle in the Southern Ocean, where there is little enforcement of
domestic and international law.
This Note examines the legal
consequences of this controversy and suggests necessary action to resolve
it peacefully, without loss of lives.
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LOVABLE PIRATES?
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BATTLE BETWEEN
ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND WHALERS IN THE SOUTHERN OCEAN
AMANDA M. CAPRARI *
I. INTRODUCTION
The term “whaling” often conjures up images of sailors long ago
departing sea-side New England towns on tall wooden ships powered by
sail and wind in search of a single animal to sustain the town through the
dark, cold winter. When considering modern-day whaling, images of
sailors with harpoons in hand are replaced by images of eight thousand-ton
diesel-powered steel ships with harpoon guns mounted on the deck,
capable of killing, processing, and packaging several whales per day.
In response to modern-day whaling, environmentalist groups have
protested the activity and demanded that it be stopped. The Sea Shepherd
Conservation Society (“Sea Shepherd”), considered one of the most radical
of such groups, has gone well beyond merely holding up protest signs and
instead has engaged in dangerous tactics, such as ramming whaling vessels
and disabling their propeller systems, all in an attempt to stop the killings.
The group specifically targets Japanese whaling ships that operate in
Antarctic waters. Sea Shepherd has created a battleground in the Southern
Ocean as it pits itself, champion of the whales, against the Japanese
whaling fleet and its multi-million dollar business of harvesting whale
meat. Despite various international laws that are designed to stop such
activity on the high seas, few countries have taken steps to interfere in this
fierce battle that will ultimately cost human lives.
Both the hunters and the protectors claim to have the legal authority to
operate as they do. Japan claims that it is not violating the International
Whaling Commission’s (“IWC” or the “Commission”) ban on commercial
whaling because it is operating under a research exception that allows
member states to kill whales each year for scientific purposes.1 Sea
Shepherd claims that under the United Nations World Charter for Nature,
the group has the authority to enforce international conservation laws by

*

United States Coast Guard Academy, B.S. 2003; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D.
Candidate 2011. I would like to thank Professor Kurt Strasser for his guidance throughout the writing
process. I would also like to thank my parents, Chris and Cathy Caprari, for their unending love. This
Note is dedicated to my husband, Dan, for always being by my side. Any errors contained herein are
mine and mine alone.
1
Raffi Khatchadourian, A Reporter at Large: Neptune’s Navy, NEW YORKER, Nov. 5, 2007, at
56, 58.
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2

any means necessary.
Specifically, Sea Shepherd claims that it is
enforcing Australia’s right under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea to create a whale sanctuary within its maritime exclusive
economic zone (“EEZ”).3 This Note analyzes the history of this conflict
and the legal arguments set forth by both Japan and Sea Shepherd, as well
as the international laws that apply to the situation.
Part II discusses the history of commercial whaling and steps taken by
nations to preserve the whale population. Part III analyzes Japan’s legal
claim that it is not violating international law by partaking in whaling,
despite the IWC’s ban on commercial whaling. Part IV examines Sea
Shepherd as well as its legal claim under the U.N. World Charter for
Nature. Part V details the various international laws that pertain to the
whalers and the conservationists. Finally, Part VI provides commentary on
what should be done to prevent the loss of human life in the Southern
Ocean that will undoubtedly result if this battle is allowed to wage
unchecked.
II. THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL WHALING
AND CONSERVATION EFFORTS
Humans have been killing whales for commercial purposes for
centuries.4 For hundreds of years, humans treated whales as a “free
resource” that could be exploited as a gift from nature by anyone who was
capable and willing to hunt them.5 Because humans lacked the technology
to harvest the whales in large numbers, however, there was little threat of
over-exploitation of the species until the advent of industrial whaling
around the eleventh century.6 After human beings developed the
technology to efficiently hunt whales farther off-shore, the market for
whale meat became more lucrative and whalers aggressively pursued
whales to all corners of the oceans.7 As a result, several whale species
were threatened with extinction, prompting the hunting and fishing
industries to realize that the survival of their business depended on
managing the whale stocks rather than over-exploiting them.8 This
2

Id. at 66.
See Natalie Klein & Nikolas Hughes, National Litigation and International Law: Repercussions
for Australia’s Protection of Marine Resources, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 163, 168–72 (2009) (discussing
Australia’s claim of an EEZ in Antarctic waters and the rights and duties that are associated with such a
claim).
4
Anthony D’Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT’L
L. 21, 28 (1991).
5
Id.
6
Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The International Whaling Commission and the Elusive Great White Whale
of Preservationism, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 389 (2009).
7
See id. at 389–90 (“From 1750 to 1870 whales were considered an economically valuable source
of oil, bone, and other products . . . .”).
8
D’Amato & Chopra, supra note 4, at 30.
3
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prompted several years of limited international regulation of the whaling
industry to preserve the vitality of the species, but these measures proved
to be largely unsuccessful.9
It was not until the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling (“ICRW”), held in 1946, that whaling nations recognized the need
for more effective measures to prevent over-exploitation of the whale
stocks.10 Spearheaded by the efforts of the United States, the ICRW set
maximum catch quotas of whales for each country and, more importantly,
established the IWC.11 Today, the IWC is the preeminent body tasked with
regulating the global whaling industry,12 designed to “provide for the
conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the whale
resources.”13 The IWC allows nations that permit their citizens to hunt
whales, as well as non-whaling nations, to become members and partake in
decisions through voting.14
In the early years of the IWC, “whilst the Preamble paid lip service to
the norm of conservation, it was essentially an arrangement between states
with an interest in commercially exploiting whales,” and member nations
focused on ways to continue to exploit the whale stocks.15 Nations
perceived the IWC as having a weak enforcement mechanism because
member nations that objected to any amendment passed by the IWC were
allowed to opt out of the decision and could disregard it.16 As a result,
even when the IWC set or attempted to enforce quotas for certain
endangered whale species, whaling nations disregarded the quotas,
“render[ing the IWC] virtually impotent.”17 Even after the creation of the
IWC, the whale population continued to decline at alarming rates as the
member nations focused on passing amendments that protected whalers’
economic interests rather than resource management.18
By the 1970s, several factors contributed to a change in philosophy of
the member nations of the IWC. Research conducted around that time
indicated that the whale population had continued to drastically decline
9

See id. at 30–32 (discussing attempts to regulate whaling from 1918–45).
Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 397–98.
11
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. III(1), V(1), Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat.
1716, T.I.A.S. 1849 [hereinafter ICRW].
12
Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 398; see also Adrienne M. Ruffle, Resurrecting the International
Whaling Commission: Suggestions To Strengthen the Conservation Effort, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639,
646–52 (2002) (outlining the history and evolution of the IWC).
13
ICRW, supra note 11, art. V(2).
14
Id. arts. II(4), III(1).
15
Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 398.
16
Id. at 399–400; see also Ruffle, supra note 12, at 653–55 (discussing how allowing member
nations to lodge objections “tak[es] the teeth” out of the IWC’s legitimacy).
17
Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 400.
18
Cinnamon Pinon Carlarne, Saving the Whales in the New Millennium: International
Institutions, Recent Developments and the Future of International Whaling Policies, 24 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 6 (2005).
10
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despite the implementation of the IWC; in 1974, the United States cited a
study that indicated that there were less than a few hundred thousand
whales in existence, compared to the four or five million in existence
before the advent of industrial whaling.19 In response to these alarming
numbers, many non-governmental organizations began to protest
commercial whaling, and the environmental groups that already were
opposed to whale hunting increased the number and intensity of their
existing protests.20 At the same time, because of the serious decline in the
whale populations, the whaling industry was no longer economically viable
for many nations, and these countries stopped whaling and began to
support preservation efforts instead.21 The United States began developing
domestic mammal protection programs to protect whales in U.S. waters,
objecting to whaling on moral grounds.22 Lastly, because the IWC allowed
non-whaling nations to become members and partake in all voting, several
nations that were against whaling joined the Commission, some at the
behest of environmental groups, in an attempt to swing votes against
commercial practices and in favor of preservation.23
As a result of the changing philosophy of members of the IWC, nations
began calling for a moratorium on commercial whaling as early as 1972.24
These nations demanded that all whaling for profit be prohibited. Japan, a
dominant voice for the pro-whaling nations, opposed any ban on
commercial whaling, calling it “dramatic and emotional,” and arguing that
the whale populations were plentiful enough to sustain further commercial
The IWC Scientific Committee backed the Japanese
whaling.25
perspective, stating that “a blanket moratorium could not be justified
scientifically” because some of the whale species that were in decline had
rebounded due to the conservation efforts.26 Despite increasing pressure
from non-whaling member nations, the IWC refused to adopt any whaling

19

Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 408.
Carlarne, supra note 18, at 6.
21
Id.; see also Ruffle, supra note 12, at 648–49 (discussing how the United States, once a
prominent whaling nation, voiced opposition to whaling, citing research that indicated whales have
advanced intellectual capacity).
22
See Howard Scott Schiffman, The Protection of Whales in International Law: A Perspective for
the Next Century, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 303, 315–17 (1996) (discussing U.S. domestic acts aimed at
the protection of marine wildlife). For commentary on why the United States chose to become such an
“ardent protector of whales,” see Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 412 (“It is arguable that the United States
might have gained a ‘reputational advantage’ in being perceived as a good environmental citizen.”).
23
Schiffman, supra note 22, at 317.
24
See, e.g., Ruffle, supra note 12, at 649 (discussing the U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment at Stockholm and its proposal for a ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling to allow
the stocks to recover).
25
PATRICIA BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING: FROM CONSERVATION OF
WHALING TO CONSERVATION OF WHALES AND REGULATION OF WHALE-WATCHING 365 (1985).
26
Id. at 422.
20
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moratorium in the 1970s. However, the moratorium remained a central
issue within the IWC, “testing both its identity and future direction.”27
The IWC finally yielded to the pressure from the preservationist
nations in 1984 when it adopted an amendment to ban all commercial
whaling amongst member states, beginning in 1986.28 The IWC set the
catch quota for commercial whaling to zero for all member nations. This
left open the possibility that the quota could one day be adjusted, allowing
commercial whaling to resume; however, the ban has been extended every
year since it first came up for renewal in 1990.29
Since 1986, Japan has emerged as the leader of a coalition to reverse
the moratorium and resume commercial whaling throughout the world,
urging the use of conservation methods rather than preservation methods.30
Following a strategy similar to the one that the environmentalist groups
followed in the 1970s, Japan is attempting to encourage pro-whaling
nations in the South Pacific and Caribbean to join the IWC in order to gain
the critical votes needed to reverse the moratorium; Japan has even been
accused of attempting to buy votes from these nations.31
Japan’s ardent pro-whaling rhetoric is somewhat surprising,
considering the number of nations that now oppose whaling on moral
grounds. However, some Japanese citizens continue to view whale meat as
a delicacy, especially members of the older generation, and many believe
that whaling is an important part of their culture.32
In order to more fully protect whale species in the Southern Ocean off
Antarctica, the IWC adopted a whale sanctuary in the Southern Ocean in
1993, prohibiting any commercial whaling in this area.33 Even if the IWC
lifts the ban on commercial whaling at some point in the future, the
Southern Ocean Sanctuary ensures that member nations will not be
allowed to hunt commercially in that area.34 Japan lodged an objection to
the creation of the sanctuary, claiming that the IWC could not justify
closing the area based on a conservationist argument.35 Their efforts to
have the sanctuary amendment repealed have thus far been unsuccessful.

27

Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 415.
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946 Schedule ¶ 10(e), available at
http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/schedule.pdf [hereinafter ICRW, 1946 Schedule].
29
Carlarne, supra note 18, at 2–3.
30
Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 422.
31
Id.
32
See PETER HELLER, THE WHALE WARRIORS 101–03 (2007); Joseph Elliott Roeschke,
Comment, Eco-Terrorism and Piracy on the High Seas: Japanese Whaling and the Rights of Private
Groups To Enforce International Conservation Law in Neutral Waters, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 99, 103–
06 (2009) (discussing the prevalence of whaling in Japanese culture).
33
ICRW, supra note 11, art. V(1)(c); ICRW, 1946 Schedule, supra note 28, ¶ 7(b).
34
ICRW, 1946 Schedule, supra note 28, ¶ 7(b); Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 442.
35
Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 442.
28
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III. JAPAN’S LEGAL CLAIM THAT WHALING ACTIVITIES
DO NOT VIOLATE THE IWC’S MORATORIUM ON COMMERCIAL WHALING
The IWC moratorium did not stop commercial whaling entirely
throughout the world. Because the ban is not legally binding on nonmember nations, Canada, an ardent supporter of whaling, chose to leave
the IWC entirely, allowing Canadian ships to continue hunting whales
commercially.36 Immediately after the moratorium was passed, Japan,
Norway, Peru, and the Soviet Union filed formal objections to the
amendment,37 which allowed them to continue commercial whaling
legally.38 Except for a brief period in which Norway chose to comply with
the moratorium, that nation has continued to hunt whales while lodging
formal objections to the ban.39
Due to pressure from the United States and threats of embargo under
the Pelly Amendment, Japan decided to stop commercial whaling activity
in 1987 and to this day claims that it does not hunt whales for profit.40 But
despite the fact that Japan claims to have stopped commercial whaling,
Japanese whaling vessels kill hundreds of whales each year under the
research exception to the 1986 moratorium. Because of a loophole in the
1946 convention that has never been corrected, Japan can slaughter whales
for “scientific purposes,” including those in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary,
without violating the IWC moratorium.41
Article VIII of the ICRW provides that “any Contracting Government
may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national
to kill, take, and treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to
such restrictions as to number and subject to other conditions as the
Contracting Government thinks fit.”42 Japan, as a member nation, is
allowed to set its own quotas for how many and what type of whales to be
killed each year for scientific research.43 Because the 1986 moratorium
applies only to commercial whaling, Japan has the legal authority to take
whales as long as it does so for “research.”44 The IWC states, “Whilst
member nations must submit proposals for review, in accordance with the
36

Id. at 400, 417.
D’Amato & Chopra, supra note 4, at 46.
38
ICRW, supra note 11, art. V(3)(c); see also supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text
(discussing the opt-out provisions of the IWC that allow member nations to disregard amendments).
39
Carlarne, supra note 18, at 9.
40
Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 421–22.
41
NAT’L TASK FORCE ON WHALING, A UNIVERSAL METAPHOR: AUSTRALIA’S OPPOSITION TO
COMMERCIAL WHALING 26 (1997), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/publications/
whaling/pubs/whaling.pdf; Carlarne, supra note 18, at 19.
42
ICRW, supra note 11, art. VIII(1).
43
See International Whaling Commission, Scientific Permit Whaling, http://www.iwcoffice.org/
conservation/permits.htm (last visited June 11, 2010) [hereinafter Scientific Permit Whaling]
(providing a complete description of the IWC scientific permit program).
44
Id.
37
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Convention, it is the member nation that ultimately decides whether or not
to issue a [research] permit, and this right overrides any other Commission
regulations including the moratorium and sanctuaries.”45 The IWC
Scientific Committee does review the research permits for validity, but it
has no authority to stop the member nation from issuing the permits and
cannot alter the quotas of whales to be killed set by the member nation.46
Japan also does not have to provide scientific studies showing the
results of its research in order to justify its continuation of its research
programs. Japan claims that the research it conducts is a population study
directed at determining when specific species will be viable enough for the
IWC to lift the ban on commercial whaling.47 In other words, Japan is
killing whales to research when the whale population will be healthy
enough to hunt whales commercially. Other member nations objected to
this population research, arguing that it could be conducted using nonlethal methods, such as taking tissue samples from live whales or using
photography to capture critical information.48 The Japanese scientists
counter that some of their research involves analyzing ear plugs and
stomach contents, which can only be done after the whales have been
killed.49 Regardless of the objections raised by other member nations, they
have no authority to restrict or prohibit Japan from continuing its research
program.
According to the IWC Scientific Committee, the study conducted by
Japanese whaling vessels in 2000 “did not address questions of high
priority relevant to management, did not make full use of existing data, and
revealed many methodological problems,”50 indicating that the research
was not producing valid results. Despite the lack of valid data, Japan
continues to issue research permits. Under the 2007–08 Japan Whale
Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic (“JARPA II”),
Japan issued permits to government-licensed ships to kill fifty Fin, fifty
Humpback, and 850 Minke whales, with a ten percent change in allowance
for Minke whales.51
As a result of the wording of the ICRW, the Japanese vessels involved
in the research hunting of whales are permitted to sell the whale meat for
profit after the research has been conducted. In fact, the wording of Article
45

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
47
Kazuo Sumi, The “Whale War” Between Japan and the United States: Problems and
Prospects, 17 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 317, 339 (1989) (“Japan emphasized that the results to be
obtained by the implementation for this program will provide a scientific basis for resolving problems
facing the IWC which have generated confrontation among the member nations due to divergent views
on the moratorium.”).
48
Id. at 339–40.
49
Id.
50
Ruffle, supra note 12, at 657.
51
Scientific Permit Whaling, supra note 43.
46
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VIII of the ICRW mandates that the meat be processed, rather than be
allowed to go to waste.52 The Japanese government has mandated that the
whale meat be sold in markets, as well as used for school and hospital
lunches, the sale of which generates approximately $74 million a year.53
While there is little doubt that Japan is complying with the letter of the law
under the IWC research exception, there is also little doubt that Japan is
only claiming to conduct research in order to circumvent the commercial
moratorium, thus not following the spirit of the ban.54
The United States, as well as other nations, has expressed its
displeasure over Japan’s scientific research program and more specifically
that Japan uses lethal methods to gather evidence that most scientists agree
could be gathered using non-lethal means.55 In 2000, President William J.
Clinton denied Japanese fishing vessels access to fishing allotments in U.S.
waters in response to Japan’s expansion of their scientific whaling
program, stating that Japan was undermining international efforts to protect
whales.56 In 2007, eight U.S. senators called on Japan to scale back its
research hunting and to abandon plans to kill one hundred whales on the
endangered species list.57 The senators, in a letter to the Japanese
ambassador to the United States, wrote:
[A] Japanese whaling fleet is en route to the Antarctic Ocean
to hunt these mammals . . . for what Japan has called research
purposes. . . . We also ask that Japan . . . employ non-lethal
techniques for studying these populations. By pursuing these
actions, Japan can continue to make significant scientific
contributions, while conserving and protecting these
important species.58
Because Japan conducts much of its hunting in the Southern Ocean
52

ICRW, supra note 11, art. VIII(2).
See HELLER, supra note 32, at 100–03 (discussing the fact that the whaling fleet must receive
government subsidies in order to continue operating and that the program has never generated enough
revenue to cover its expenses); Justin McCurry, Big Sushi: The World’s Most Politically Sensitive
Lunch, MONTHLY, Aug. 2006, at 42, 45–47 (noting that because the demand for whale meat has
decreased, especially amongst the younger generations, the government has sought ways to deplete its
whale meat stock by using it for government purposes).
54
See, e.g., William C. Burns, The International Whaling Commission and the Future of
Cetaceans: Problems and Prospects, 8 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 31, 49 (1997) (“Japan,
Norway, and Iceland have dutifully submitted scientific research proposals to the IWC and then
blithely ignored its recommendations that such programs should not be pursued.”); Roeschke, supra
note 32, at 112 (“Japan . . . chose to conceal their whaling practices under the guise of scientific
research.”); Ruffle, supra note 12, at 656 (“[T]he research is only a thinly-veiled attempt to maintain
the profitability of the commercial whaling industry.”).
55
See Sumi, supra note 47, at 339 (“The Committee members . . . emphasized that non-lethal
methods were available for the estimation of recruitment and the study of stock identity.”).
56
David E. Sanger, Japan: Clinton Orders Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2000, at A6.
57
Press Release, Sen. Barbara Boxer, Senators Call on Japan To Limit Whale Hunt and Spare
Protected Whales (Nov. 29, 2007), available at http://boxer.senate.gov/en/press/releases/112907.cfm#.
58
Id.
53
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Sanctuary, which is near Australian territorial seas, Australia has become
particularly vocal about its opposition to Japanese whaling. Although
Australia was at one time a staunch pro-whaling nation, it has become one
of the most prominent whaling opponents in recent years and has adopted
measures to stop whaling both domestically and internationally.59
Australia is a member of the IWC and therefore complies with the
moratorium on commercial whaling. It also has voiced a great deal of
opposition to Japanese research whaling, especially when it occurs near
Australian waters.60
The Southern Ocean Sanctuary, established by the IWC, is located in
close proximity to Australian territorial seas. While no commercial
whaling is permitted in the sanctuary, the Japanese research fleet often
hunts for its quota of research kills in this area.61 In an attempt to stop
whaling in Australian waters, the Australian government established an
EEZ in the area in 1994 and claims that the waters are protected Australian
territory.62
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”), a nation has exclusive sovereignty over the waters of its
territorial seas,63 which typically consists of all waters up to twelve
nautical miles from the country’s shoreline.64 Any vessel passing through
another nation’s territorial seas is subject to that nation’s criminal and civil
laws but is also afforded the right of safe passage.65 A nation may claim a
contiguous zone up to twenty-four miles from its baseline, in which the
nation can enforce violations of customs, immigration, and sanitary laws.66
A nation may also claim an EEZ up to 200 miles from its baseline for the
purpose of establishing exclusive rights to explore and exploit the natural
resources found there.67 Australia maintains that there is an EEZ extending
200 miles from all Australian sovereign territory.68 It is not uncommon for
a country to exercise its right to claim an EEZ in order to extensively
regulate the resources in the area and prevent over-use.69
59
See Donald K. Anton, Antarctic Whaling: Australia’s Attempt To Protect Whales in the
Southern Ocean, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 319, 325–32 (2009).
60
See, e.g., NAT’L TASK FORCE ON WHALING, supra note 41, at 7–8, 63–64.
61
Id. at 26.
62
Anton, supra note 59, at 328.
63
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
64
Id. art. 3.
65
Id. arts. 27–28.
66
Id. art. 33.
67
Id. arts. 56–57; see also Klein & Hughes, supra note 3, at 168–72 (further explaining maritime
zones under UNCLOS).
68
Anton, supra note 59, at 328.
69
For example, the United States established an EEZ in 1982 through a presidential proclamation
and claims sovereign control over fishing rights up to two hundred miles from all U.S. shorelines.
48 C.J.S. International Law § 15 (2004).
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Australia’s claimed EEZ includes not only the waters 200 nautical
miles off the coast of Australia, but also the waters around Antarctica,
where the Japanese whaling vessels often hunt.70 Australia has claimed
sovereignty over part of Antarctica, called the Australian Antarctic
Territory, since 1933, asserting that it is Australian land.71 Accordingly,
Australia asserts that the EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from this territory
as well as from mainland Australia.72
Under UNCLOS, a nation claiming an EEZ has the authority to protect
and preserve the marine wildlife within the EEZ.73 In accordance with this
authority, after establishing its EEZ in Antarctic waters, Australia created a
whale sanctuary in the area, called the Australian Whale Sanctuary,
making it a violation of Australian law to kill a whale in these waters.74
While its claim of an EEZ extending 200 miles off the coast of mainland Australia is widely recognized, Australia’s claim of an EEZ in
Antarctic waters is extremely controversial and recognized by only a
handful of other nations.75 Australia signed the Antarctic Treaty in 1959
and, in doing so, agreed not to pursue its sovereignty claims in Antarctic
while the treaty was still in force.76 Because the Antarctic Treaty has not
been revoked, most nations do not recognize Australia’s right to claim an
EEZ off the Antarctic territory because, in doing so, they contradict the
treaty to which their signature is affixed by claiming that the Antarctic land
is part of Australia.77 Additionally, Australia’s EEZ is challenged under
UNCLOS because it conflicts with other nations’ sovereign claims in
Antarctic waters.78 Due to the questions of legality over Australia’s
claims, only France, New Zealand, Great Britain, and Norway recognize
the Australian EEZ in Antarctica.79 Thus far, Australia has not enforced its
domestic law against Japanese whalers hunting in its EEZ, in part because
of the controversy surrounding its claim and the fact that it is not well
recognized.80
Despite the fact that the Australian government has not sought to
enforce its domestic laws against whaling ships in the EEZ, a private
70

See Klein & Hughes, supra note 3, at 171.
Joanna Mossop, When Is a Whale Sanctuary Not a Whale Sanctuary? Japanese Whaling in
Australian Antarctic Maritime Zones, 36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 757, 763 (2005).
72
Klein & Hughes, supra note 3, at 172.
73
UNCLOS, supra note 63, art. 56.
74
Mossop, supra note 71, at 759.
75
Klein & Hughes, supra note 3, at 171.
76
The Antarctic Treaty was written to prevent disputes over sovereignty of the area from
interfering with the governance of Antarctica. It encourages, but does not demand, cooperation
between different nations who have a sovereign claim over the land. For further discussion of the
legality of Australia’s maritime Antarctic zones, see Mossop, supra note 71, at 763–66.
77
Klein & Hughes, supra note 3, at 171–72.
78
See id. at 170–71 (discussing the issues that arise when EEZs “overlap”).
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Id. at 171 n.53.
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See id. at 172.
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citizen group filed suit in Australian federal court in 2008 seeking an
injunction against the Japanese whaling company Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha
Ltd. to stop the hunting of whales within the Australian Whale Sanctuary.81
Although the injunctions were ultimately granted by the Australian federal
court, they have not been enforced against the Japanese vessels and are
ostensibly without effect.82
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SEA SHEPHERD CONSERVATION SOCIETY AND
LEGAL CLAIM UNDER THE U.N. WORLD CHARTER FOR NATURE
Japan has faced intense pressure from other nations, including the
United States, to stop killing whales as part of its research program.83
However, the IWC has not taken the steps necessary to close the research
loophole to prevent the Japanese from exploiting it. Because of this lack of
action by member nations of the IWC, environmental groups have taken it
upon themselves to disrupt what they view as illegal Japanese whaling in
the Southern Ocean.84 Sea Shepherd has taken the lead in attacking the
whaling fleet, in part because it takes chances that no other organization is
willing to take in order to stop the killing of whales.85
Sea Shepherd was founded in 1977 by Paul Watson, a well-known
environmental activist, whose actions often puts the lives of whales above
the lives of people.86 Sea Shepherd, which is supported by private
donations, claims that its mission is “to end the destruction of habitat and
slaughter of wildlife in the world’s oceans in order to conserve and protect
ecosystems and species.”87 In order to fulfill its mission, the group “uses
innovative direct-action tactics to investigate, document, and take action
when necessary to expose and confront illegal activities on the high
seas.”88 These direct-action tactics include ramming whaling vessels,
firing smoke canisters at their decks, and using ropes to entangle the
vessels’ propellers.89
Paul Watson is undoubtedly the face of Sea Shepherd, as he touts
himself as the captain of the organization’s vessels and Master and
81

Humane Soc’y Int’l Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd. (2008) 165 F.C.R. 510 (Austl.).
See Anton, supra note 59, at 332–39 (providing a complete discussion of the case); Mossop,
supra note 71, at 758–62 (discussing the early history of the case).
83
See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text (discussing the United States’ opposition to
Japan’s whaling research program).
84
See, e.g., Greenpeace, Full Proposal: Roadmap to Recovery, http://www.greenpeace.org/
international/campaigns/oceans/marine-reserves/roadmap-to-recovery (last visited June 11, 2010)
(asking individuals opposed to whaling to sign a petition to create marine reserves).
85
See Whaling: Salty Shepherds, ECONOMIST, Jan. 26, 2008, at 43–44.
86
See Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 58.
87
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Who We Are, http://www.seashepherd.org/who-we-are/
(last visited June 11, 2010).
88
Id.
89
Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 58, 60.
82
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Commander of their voyages to the Southern Ocean.
A Canadian
national, Watson, along with a group of like-minded activists, founded
Greenpeace in the early seventies, but he was later voted out of the
organization for violating their pacifist ethos and using violence to achieve
results.91 After being expelled from Greenpeace, Watson turned his
attention to stopping whaling. Using funds from an animal-welfare
advocate, Watson purchased his first ship in 1978, filled its front hull with
concrete in order to facilitate the ramming of other ships, and steered it into
a whaling vessel off Portugal, causing severe damage.92 Since then, he
claims responsibility for ramming numerous whaling ships and disrupting
countless other whale and seal hunts.93
Sea Shepherd currently has three vessels that it uses in its anti-whaling
campaigns. The largest of the vessels, the Farley Mowat, has a reinforced
steel hull so that it can push through ice fields in the Antarctic waters
without sustaining damage.94 The Steve Irwin, named in honor of the late
Australian celebrity and conservationist, is the vessel currently being used
in campaigns against the Japanese whaling fleet in the Southern Ocean.95
The organization’s newest vessel bears the name Bob Barker; it was
originally commissioned as a Norwegian whaler but was later purchased
by Sea Shepherd with five million dollars that was donated to the group by
the American game show host.96
The organization relies on private funds and a crew of volunteers to
carry out its anti-whaling campaigns. Its donors include celebrities such as
Mick Jagger and Steve Wynn, the Las Vegas casino owner.97 The majority
of the crew are volunteers from a host of different nations, including
Australia, the United States, Japan, New Zealand, and the Netherlands,98
and they receive only room and board in exchange for their work on the
campaigns.99 The majority of Sea Shepherd’s campaigns to stop the
90
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Master and Commander: Complete List of Sea Shepherd
Voyages, 1979–2008, http://www.seashepherd.org/who-we-are/master-and-commander.html (last
visited June 11, 2010).
91
See Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 65 (“[H]e seemed possessed by too powerful a drive, too
unrelenting a desire to push himself front and center, shouldering everyone else aside.”).
92
See Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 65; Environment: Victory at Sea, TIME, July 30, 1979, at
69.
93
See Roeschke, supra note 32, at 99.
94
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Neptune’s Navy, http://www.seashepherd.org/who-weare/the-fleet.html (last visited June 11, 2010).
95
Id.
96
Mark McDonald, Ships Collide in War of Nerves over Whaling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at
A10. The group also owns a high-speed vessel called the Ady Gil, but it was badly damaged in a
collision with a Japanese whaler in January 2010 and is no longer sea-worthy. See id.
97
Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 58–59.
98
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Sea Shepherd Crew, http://www.seashepherd.org/who-weare/ships-crews.html (last visited June 11, 2010).
99
The volunteer information page of the Sea Shepherd website states that the organization is
seeking “people who burn inside with a rage against the injustices perpetrated upon whales . . . . No
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Japanese whaling fleet take place in the Southern Ocean, off the coast of
Antarctica, where the Japanese whaling fleet conducts the majority of its
hunting.100
The tactics employed by Sea Shepherd against the Japanese whaling
fleet are sensational, sometimes violent, and intended to be extremely
destructive. Sea Shepherd’s actions have prompted Japan and other
nations to label the group “pirates” and “terrorists.”101 Watson is no longer
allowed to attend IWC meetings because many conservationists believe
that his actions have actually turned sympathy away from anti-whaling
nations.102
Sea Shepherd vessels are equipped to damage whaling vessels. The
Farley Mowat is fitted with a customized device called “the can opener,”
which consists of a sharpened steel I-beam that is affixed to the side of the
ship and is designed to puncture the hull of whaling vessels.103 Watson has
also attempted to ram the Farley Mowat into the stern of a whaling vessel;
Sea Shepherd boasts that the group is responsible for sinking ten whaling
vessels since 1979 using these types of tactics.104
Sea Shepherd was recently involved in a collision with a Japanese
whaling vessel. On February 5, 2009, the Steve Irwin and the Yushin Maru
No. 2, a whaling ship flying under the Japanese flag, collided while
underway in the Southern Ocean.105 Each group issued statements shortly
after the incident blaming the other party and, even though neither vessel
sustained severe damage, it was clear from statements from both sides that
the Steve Irwin maneuvered too close to the Japanese whaler in an attempt
to disrupt it from transferring a dead whale to a processing ship.106
whiners, malcontents, mattress lovers, and wimps need apply.” Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, A
Call for Planetary Duty!, http://www.seashepherd.org/get-involved/crewing-at-sea.html (last visited
June 11, 2010).
100
See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Press Release, Sea Shepherd Conservation
Soc’y, Sea Shepherd Announces New Antarctic Research Project (June 24, 2009), available at
http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and-media/news-090624-1.html.
101
Meraiah Foley & Mark McDonald, Japan Seeks Australia’s Help To Thwart Whaling
Opponents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at A10; see also Roeschke, supra note 32, at 107 (“Officials in
Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Japan, Canada and Costa Rica have publicly denounced Watson,
comparing his actions to that of a common terrorist.”).
102
Roeschke, supra note 32, at 107–08.
103
Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 58.
104
Id. at 66; see also Press Release, Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, Victory for the Whales in
Berlin (June 16, 2003), available at http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and-media/news-030616-1.html
(“Kill a whale; prepare to go to the bottom. The only practical use of an outlaw whaling ship is for
underwater habitat for fish.”).
105
Press Release, Inst. of Cetacean Research, Dutch Vessel Rams Japanese Research Ship
(Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.icrwhale.org/pdf/090206-2Release.pdf.
106
See id.; Press Release, Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, Whaling Opponents Collide at Sea
(Feb. 5, 2009), available at http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and-media/news-090205-2.html (“We’re
shepherds and we will do what we can to protect our flock from these murderous poachers.”). In
January 2010, a Japanese whaling vessel collided with the Sea Shepherd’s high-speed vessel, the Ady
Gil, which was split into two pieces by the force of the blow. One person was injured in the accident.
As with the February 2009 collision, each side blamed the other for the incident. McDonald, supra
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Sea Shepherd has also used prop foulers to disable the propellers of the
whaling vessels.107 To deploy the device, the group maneuvers its vessel in
front of the whaling ships while they are making way through the water
and then cuts across the bow of the vessel, dropping the prop fouler made
of rope, steel cables, and buoys into the wake of the whaling vessel.108 A
vessel that has a disabled propeller is at the mercy of the sea and is unable
to steer into the waves to avoid capsizing.109 The Sea Shepherd crew also
attempts to disrupt the processing of whale meat on the vessels by
throwing canisters of butyric acid on the deck of the ships, which spoils the
whale meat because of its rancid smell.110 Some workers on the Japanese
vessels have claimed that they sustained injuries after being hit with such
canisters.111
In perhaps their most daring move to date, two Sea Shepherd
crewmembers boarded one of the Japanese whaling vessels at sea in
January 2008.112 One British and one Australian crewmember jumped
from a Sea Shepherd vessel onto the deck of the Yushin Maru No. 2 while
it was underway in the Southern Ocean, claiming that they were not trying
to harm the crew but were there only to deliver a letter asking the vessel to
end the whale hunt.113 Sea Shepherd stated that after the activists jumped
onto the deck of the whaling ship, crewmembers “roughed [them] up” and
detained them against their will.114 The Japanese whalers claimed that the
activists were pirates who boarded the vessel illegally and tied the men to
the mast of their ship.115 The Japanese whalers detained the two
crewmembers for three days before transferring them to Australian
authorities, who returned the pair to the Steve Irwin without filing
charges.116

note 96.
107

See HELLER, supra note 32, at 110.
See id. at 165, 203.
Id.
110
Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 60.
111
Media Release, Inst. of Cetacean Research, Sea Shepherd Attacks Japan’s Research Vessels
(Mar. 3, 2008), available at http://www.icrwhale.org/eng/080303Release.pdf.
112
See Japanese Offer Fails To End Whaling Standoff, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/ (search for “Japanese Offer Fails To End Whaling”; then follow hyperlink)
(discussing the incident and the Japanese claims that “this can be seen as nothing more than an act of
piracy by the Sea Shepherd group”).
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Roeschke, supra note 32, at 108, 109 & n.66. In February 2010, a Sea Shepherd crewmember
again boarded a Japanese vessel at sea by jumping onto the ship in an attempt to make a citizen’s arrest
of the Japanese ship’s captain and to demand $3 million as payment for the destruction of the Ady Gil.
The Japanese have stated their intention to try the crewmember in Japanese criminal court on intrusion
charges. Tomoko A. Hosaka, Japan Indicts Activist Who Boarded Whaling Ship, ASSOCIATED PRESS
ASIA, Apr. 2, 2010.
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Sea Shepherd’s antics are so dramatic that they caught the eye of the
U.S. cable network Discovery, which created a show called Whale Wars
that documents the exploits of the group as they pursue the whaling
fleet.117 The popularity of the show, which airs on the network’s Animal
Planet channel, prompted Discovery to agree to a contract extension with
Sea Shepherd, and it is about to enter its third season on cable television.
It is Animal Planet’s second-best performing show in the network’s
history.118
The Japanese scientific body that funds the hunting trips to the
Southern Ocean has accused the Discovery network of colluding with Sea
Shepherd to carry out unlawful acts in order to produce better footage for
the show, claiming that the group’s propensity for violence increased after
filming began.119 The first season of Whale Wars included footage of the
two crewmembers boarding the Yushin Maru No. 2.120
Despite the aggressive actions of Watson and his crew, few Sea
Shepherd members have been charged with criminal activity in connection
with their antics. Neither Watson nor the two crewmembers who boarded
the Japanese whaling vessel in 2008 were charged with any crime,
although Japan has threatened to bring suit against them.121 Watson has
been charged with violating domestic laws in Canada but has spent little
time in jail for these mostly minor offenses.122 Watson at times even
demanded to be charged with ramming vessels in an attempt to publicize
the plight of his group, but he conducts most of his activities in
international waters where the laws and jurisdiction are unclear, thus
allowing him to avoid serious consequences.123
Watson claims that Sea Shepherd has legal justification for its actions
against the Japanese whaling vessels under the United Nations World
Charter for Nature (“World Charter”).124 The World Charter was adopted
in 1982 to provide “appropriate measures at the national and international
levels to protect nature and promote international co-operation in that

117
Press Release, Animal Planet, Animal Planet’s “Whale Wars” Returns from High Seas with
Record Viewership in Finale and in Second Season (Aug. 25, 2009), available at http://press.discovery.
com/us/apl/press-releases/2009/animal-planets-whale-wars-returns-high-seas-record/.
118
Id.
119
See Press Release, Inst. of Cetacean Research, Animal Planet Collaborated with Ecoterrorists
(Oct. 29, 2008), available at http://www.icrwhale.org/pdf/081029Release.pdf (“Mr. Minoru Morimoto,
Director General of the Institute of Cetacean Research, said: ‘It is difficult to understand why a
mainstream network would stoop so low as to produce a series that glamorizes and thereby gives
support to ecoterrorism.’”).
120
Animal Planet, Whale Wars, Episode Guide, http://animal.discovery.com/tv/whale-wars/
episode/ (last visited June 11, 2010).
121
Roeschke, supra note 32, at 128.
122
HELLER, supra note 32, at 98–99.
123
See Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 66.
124
Id.
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field.”
It was an attempt to set guidelines by which countries should
guide their actions in regards to conserving nature and urges human beings
to consider their responsibilities toward the environment.126 The United
States was the only nation to reject the proclamation.127 The World
Charter is a resolution and is therefore non-binding on any party to it
because it does not constitute a formal source of international law.128
Specifically, Sea Shepherd cites paragraph 21 of the World Charter,
which states that individuals and groups “shall [s]afeguard and conserve
nature in areas beyond national jurisdiction,” which includes the Antarctic
territory.129 Watson often invokes this section of the World Charter when
asked to justify the ramming of vessels at sea.130 Sea Shepherd claims that
the Japanese whaling fleet is violating international laws by commercially
hunting the whales, and therefore the group is justified in stopping the
illegal activity by reason of “colour of right.”131
Sea Shepherd’s reliance on the World Charter as legal justification for
its actions is clearly misplaced. Even if Japan were whaling illegally—
which it is almost universally accepted that they are not132—the resolution
does not provide justification for Sea Shepherd to ram or otherwise attempt
to disrupt the whaling vessels. The World Charter is non-binding
legislation that was drafted to encourage nations to work together to
protect the environment and intended only to set moral principles as to how
nations should act.133 The World Charter also has no enforcement
provisions for nations or individuals.134 Critics of Sea Shepherd’s use of
the World Charter for justification of its actions state that its interpretation
of its legal authority is “[c]learly wrong” and that “[t]here is no ambiguity”
125
World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, ¶ 455, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (Oct. 28, 1982)
[hereinafter World Charter for Nature].
126
Susan Emmenegger & Axel Tschentscher, Taking Nature’s Rights Seriously: The Long Way to
Biocentrism in Environmental Law, 6 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 569 (1994).
127
Id.
128
But see id. at 570 (“It is also worth noting that the General Assembly adopted the World
Charter for Nature in the form of a solemn declaration, the same as used for the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. This gives it a special standing on the platform of international law.”).
129
World Charter for Nature, supra note 125, ¶ 21; see also id. ¶ 21(e) (“Each person has a duty
to act in accordance with the provisions of the present Charter.”).
130
See, e.g., Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 66 (discussing how Watson cited the World Charter
as the reason why he has not been charged with a crime).
131
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Mandate, http://www.seashepherd.org/who-we-are/
mandate.html (last visited June 11, 2010).
132
See supra notes 42–54 and accompanying text (discussing the legal research loophole that
Japan exploits in order to continue whaling in the Southern Ocean).
133
See LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: FROM THE
TWENTIETH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 100 (3rd ed. 1996) (“[T]he charter [is] a significant
symbolic expression of a hope among nations to achieve a more harmonious and sustainable
relationship between humanity and the rest of the biosphere—between mankind and earth.” (emphasis
added)); Roseann Eshbach, Comment, A Global Approach to the Protection of the Environment:
Balancing State Sovereignty and Global Interests, 4 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 271, 297–98 (1990)
(discussing the intentions of the World Charter).
134
Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 66.
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135

on the matter.
While Sea Shepherd boasts many supporters around the
world,136 several nations, including the United States, and environmental
groups have denounced its aggressive tactics and its misuse of the World
Charter as justification.137
V. APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Despite strong rhetoric from the United States and other nations about
their opposition to Sea Shepherd’s tactics, no nation has yet taken action
under international law to stop Sea Shepherd. The group operates on the
high seas in part because international law is vague and difficult to enforce
on the seas.138 There are several international laws which may be
applicable to the situation between Sea Shepherd and the Japanese whaling
fleet in the Southern Ocean. Each international law that could be applied
to the situation, however, has flaws that make it difficult to enforce.
A. Piracy Under UNCLOS
Piracy is currently one of the most pressing issues in international law
because of the recent outbreak of attacks off the coast of Africa and the
fact that much of the world’s commerce is transported via the oceans.139
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea defines piracy as “any illegal
acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship . . . directed on
the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft.”140 All states share the obligation
to suppress acts of piracy on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any
state.141
135

Id.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing Sea Shepherd’s celebrity supporters).
137
See Int’l Whaling Commission, Resolution on the Safety of Vessels Engaged in Whaling and
Whale-Research Related Activities, Resolution 2006-2 (2006), available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/
meetings/resolutions/resolution2006.htm#2 (stating that “the Commission and its Contracting
Governments do not condone any actions that are a risk to human life and property in relation to these
activities of vessels at sea, and urges persons and entities to refrain from such acts”); HELLER, supra
note 32, at 29–30 (referring to the strained relationship between Sea Shepherd and Greenpeace and the
fact that Greenpeace has referred to Watson as an “ecoterrorist”); Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 59
(discussing how Greenpeace has distanced itself from Sea Shepherd); Press Release, Nat’l Oceanic and
Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Whaling Commissioner Denounces Sea Shepherd’s Clash with Japanese
Whalers (Feb. 9, 2007), available at http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/releases2007/feb07/noaa07-riwc.html (“The United States is extremely concerned that encounters like this could escalate into more
violent interactions between the vessels. We still oppose Japan’s research whale hunts, but the way to
resolve this is through the IWC process.”).
138
Roeschke, supra note 32, at 108.
139
See, e.g., James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Repressing Piracy in the 21st Century: An
International Maritime Threat Response Plan, 40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 43, 43–45 (2009) (discussing
recent high-profile piracy attacks and piracy’s profitability).
140
UNCLOS, supra note 63, art. 101.
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Id.
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There are several problems in applying this definition of piracy in
international law, as UNCLOS “suffers from several defects which have
hobbled the usefulness of these conventions in combating piracy and
modern crime.”142 One particularly difficult problem with the definition of
piracy under UNCLOS is determining what constitutes “private ends.”
This term is nowhere defined in the text of UNCLOS, but it seems to
exclude political activities, which would exclude maritime terrorism from
the definition of piracy.143 Traditionally, a pirate is considered “a private
individual whose heinous acts are aimed towards achieving some personal
economic benefit,” so the term “private ends” is typically understood as an
act done for economic gain.144
Another ambiguity of the definition of piracy under UNCLOS is the
term “illegal acts.” If “illegal acts” is defined under international law,
there is little ambiguity as to what constitutes an illegal act. If, however,
the term is defined under national law, there could be discrepancies in how
the piracy laws are enforced because the legality of certain acts differs
depending on national law.145
In accordance with UNCLOS, states have the sole obligation to repress
piracy in international waters or in any place outside their respective
jurisdictions, or, in other words, outside another nation’s twelve-mile
territorial sea.146 Therefore, any nation that is aware of acts of piracy being
committed on the high seas has an obligation to help the victims and to
bring the pirates to justice in municipal courts.147 The municipal courts are
tasked with working through the ambiguities in the definition of piracy and
applying international law at a national level.148
Enforcing piracy under UNCLOS, however, has proven extremely
difficult. Nations are hesitant to prosecute pirates under international laws
in their municipal courts because piracy has traditionally been viewed as a
domestic problem.149 Nations typically only intervene to stop piracy acts
committed on the high seas if the state’s own interests are threatened by
piracy. Indeed, states will even ignore pleas for assistance from distressed

142
Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The New “Jamaica Discipline”: Problems with Piracy, Maritime
Terrorism and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 127, 141 (1990).
143
See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The Case of the Castle John, or Greenbeard the Pirate?:
Environmentalism, Piracy and the Development of International Law, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 4
(1993) (discussing the shortcomings of the UNCLOS definition with respect to private ends).
144
Monica Pathak, Maritime Violence: Piracy at Sea & Marine Terrorism Today, 20 WINDSOR
REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 65, 73–74 (2005).
145
Menefee, The Case of the Castle John, supra note 143, at 4.
146
UNCLOS, supra note 63, arts. 3, 100.
147
See id. arts. 279–99 (outlining the procedures for prosecuting violations of UNCLOS).
148
Carlo Tiribelli, Time To Update the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 8 OR. REV. INT’L L. 133, 140 (2006).
149
See MARTIN N. MURPHY, SMALL BOATS, WEAK STATES, DIRTY MONEY: THE CHALLENGE OF
PIRACY 19 (2009).
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150

vessels off of their coasts, even though they have an obligation to assist
under UNCLOS. Thus, most nations do not want to burden themselves
with apprehending and prosecuting pirates unless it affects their own
vessels or their own state interests.
Adding to the enforcement problems, UNCLOS is further weakened
by ambiguity with regard to enforcement within a nation’s contiguous and
exclusive economic zones.151 While it is clear that individual nations have
the duty to enforce domestic piracy laws within their own territorial seas
(within twelve nautical miles from shore), there is conflicting commentary
over whether nations have an obligation under UNCLOS to repress piracy
if it occurs in another nation’s contiguous zone (extending twenty-four
miles from a nation’s shoreline)152 or EEZ (extending two hundred miles
from a nation’s shoreline).153 Because there is legal ambiguity over
whether UNCLOS was intended to extend to these waters, nations have
argued that piracy is a domestic criminal problem that should be dealt with
under domestic law.154 Consequently, criminals can avoid prosecution as
pirates by operating just inside the territorial sea line, thus falling outside
UNCLOS jurisdiction in most commentators’ view.155
As a result of this legal wrangling and the unclear definition of piracy
under UNCLOS, it is unlikely that Sea Shepherd members will be
successfully prosecuted as pirates for acts that they commit outside the
twelve-mile territorial sea limit of any nation. Most of Sea Shepherd’s
activities take place outside of Australia’s territorial seas because that is
where the Japanese whaling fleet conducts its research hunts.156 By
conducting its activities outside this territorial sea limit, Sea Shepherd
takes advantage of the vagueness of the UNCLOS law.157 Australia and
other nations that operate vessels in the Southern Ocean could potentially
bring charges against members of Sea Shepherd under the UNCLOS
provisions if their vessels intervened in the action between Sea Shepherd
and the Japanese whaling ships. These nations, however, are not eager to
prosecute Sea Shepherd because they are opposed to what they view as
Japan’s use of the research loophole in the IWC to continue commercial
150

Id. at 18.
See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of an EEZ under
UNCLOS).
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See MURPHY, supra note 149, at 15 (analyzing the legal ambiguity over whether coastal states
can exercise their right to control piracy in their contiguous zone).
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Id. at 17.
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See id. at 9 (observing that, regarding this definition of piracy, “[t]he only people who are
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158

whaling.
There is no international maritime peacekeeping force on
which to rely.159 Additionally, even if the nations did apprehend the
members of Sea Shepherd, there is no established international tribunal
with jurisdiction to try and punish pirates, so any prosecution would have
to take place in Australia’s municipal courts.160
Sea Shepherd members also likely cannot be prosecuted as pirates
because their actions are not done for private ends. Under the UNCLOS
definition, illegal acts of violence and degradation are considered acts of
piracy if committed for private ends on the high seas.161 Sea Shepherd’s
actions of ramming whaling vessels and disabling their propellers would
most likely be considered acts of violence and degradation. Although
“private ends” is not clearly defined under UNCLOS, Sea Shepherd
derives no financial profit from its harassment of the whaling fleet and it is
unlikely that its actions would be considered done for private ends, thus
excluding the group’s activities from piracy under UNCLOS.162 For these
reasons, it is unlikely that any nation would attempt to prosecute members
of Sea Shepherd as pirates under UNCLOS, much less be successful in that
prosecution.
There has been one successful prosecution of an environmental group
under UNCLOS piracy laws. The Belgian Court of Cassation found that
Greenpeace had committed acts of piracy when its members interfered
with two commercial tankers who were attempting to legally dump waste
into the ocean.163 The court found that the members of Greenpeace had
committed the acts for “private ends” because their motivation was the
achievement of Greenpeace goals and were therefore subject to the
UNCLOS piracy laws.164 The case “stands for the proposition that
maritime environmental violence may qualify as piracy under international
law.”165 Despite the success of this case, it has not been widely followed,
and there have been no subsequent prosecutions of environmentalists as
pirates under UNCLOS in the twenty years since this case was decided.
B. Terrorism Under International Law
Because Sea Shepherd’s actions are unlikely to be classified as piracy,
many nations, including the United States, consider the group eco158

See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
Tiribelli, supra note 148, at 141.
160
Id.
161
UNCLOS, supra note 63, art. 100(a).
162
See Menefee, The Case of the Castle John, supra note 143, at 5 (“[T]he problem of
demonstrating a non-private end is compounded . . . by environmentally-motivated actions which are
not easily categorized.”).
163
Castle John and Nederlandse Stichting Sirius v. NV Mabeco and NV Parfin, 77 I.L.R. 537,
537–41 (Belg. Ct. Cass. 1986).
164
See Menefee, The Case of the Castle John, supra note 143, at 13–14.
165
Id. at 14.
159
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terrorists. There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, but
there are some generally accepted guidelines for how to classify acts of
terrorism. The line between piracy and marine terrorism is often
blurred,168 but “piracy and terrorism are not interchangeable
phenomena.”169 Whereas pirates usually seek financial gain, marine
terrorists are motivated by the opportunity to make a political or
ideological statement.170 Pirates often want to remain anonymous and have
their attacks go largely unnoticed in the global community, but, on the
contrary, marine terrorists are interested in publishing their actions so that
all may hear their political message.171
Additionally, terrorism is described as “coercion” through “a use of
force.”172
Terrorism is “the public and systematic use of . . .
‘extranormal’ . . . violence . . . through the loss of life, property or prestige,
mainly and ostensibly for political purposes.”173 In order to be effective,
terrorists must “inflict or threaten to inflict intolerable damage.”174 While
the term “intolerable” is itself ambiguous, it is clear that the damage
inflicted by a group must be significant in order to constitute terrorism
under this definition.175
166

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Testimony of James F. Jarboe, Domestic Terrorism Section
Chief, Counterterrorism Division, FBI, The Threat of Eco-Terrorism (Feb. 12, 2002), available at
www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jarboe021202.htm (describing how acts of “eco-terrorism” have
occurred around the globe and identifying Sea Shepherd as one of the first organizations to partake in
such acts); see also HELLER, supra note 32, at 147–48 (discussing how one of the eco-terrorists
mentioned in the Jarboe statement helped Watson sink two whaling ships in Iceland in 1986).
167
See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he nations of the world are so divisively split on the legitimacy of such aggression as
to make it impossible to pinpoint an area of harmony or consensus.”); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 17 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Attempts to reach a fixed, universally accepted definition of
international terrorism have been frustrated both by changes in terrorist methodology and the lack of
any precise definition of the term ‘terrorism.’”); Sami Zeidan, Desperately Seeking Definition: The
International Community’s Quest for Identifying the Specter of Terrorism, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 491,
492 (2004) (“[T]errorism easily falls prey to change that suits the interests of particular states at
particular times.”).
168
See Pathak, supra note 144, at 73–74.
169
Tammy M. Sittnick, Comment, State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism in the Strait of
Malacca: Persuading Indonesia and Malaysia To Take Additional Steps To Secure the Strait, 14 PAC.
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 743, 751 (2005).
170
Helmut Tuerk, Combating Terrorism at Sea—The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, 15 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 337, 343 (2008); see also Pathak,
supra note 144, at 74 (“[I]n the case of a terrorist, he or she is typically viewed as being religiously or
morally obligated to undertake a terrorist action which appears to be just.”).
171
Tuerk, supra note 170, at 343.
172
Richard K. Betts, The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror,
117 POL. SCI. Q. 19, 20 (2002).
173
MURPHY, supra note 149, at 184.
174
Id.
175
Incidents of maritime terrorism typically, but not always, involve loss of life. For example, in
2004, marine terrorists planted a bomb on a 10,000-ton ferry in Philippine waters, killing an estimated
116 people. The most notorious act of marine terrorism was the attack on the Achille Lauro, a cruise
ship that was boarded by members of the Palestine Liberation Front in Israeli waters in 1985. One
passenger was killed and several hundred others were held hostage. Also, eleven people were killed in
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Prosecution of terrorists often takes place in national courts rather than
international tribunals. The multilateral treaties and conventions that
define terrorism generally lack international enforcement mechanisms to
ensure the enforcement of their terms.176 The biggest obstacle that
international law makers face in creating enforcement mechanisms is
determining who will bear the cost of enforcement and surveillance of the
treaty. In order to get around this obstacle, international law makers
typically devolve these activities to the states themselves, “piggy-backing”
on domestic law and enforcement.177 Several multilateral conventions that
focus on the suppression of terrorism have imposed obligations on the
states to implement the terms domestically without use of an international
tribunal, including the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention and the 1971
Montreal Convention.178
It is important to note that many nations, not only Australia, have an
obligation to prosecute terrorists under multilateral conventions. These
conventions adopt a “no safe haven” principle in that state parties to the
convention either must prosecute or extradite those alleged to have been
involved in terrorist activities to another country that is also a party to the
treaty.179 Therefore, any party to a convention that prohibits terrorism is
obligated to either prosecute or extradite alleged terrorists that are found
within their jurisdiction.
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA”) was adopted in 1988 to
specifically address acts of terrorism at sea that are not covered by the
UNCLOS piracy laws.180 It was an attempt to consolidate and apply
previous “anti-terrorism conventions by adapting their provisions to the
maritime field.”181 Australia,182 the Netherlands,183 and the United States184

an attack on the ship City of Poros in waters south of Athens in 1988. Id. at 187–90.
176
C. L. Lim, The Question of a Generic Definition of Terrorism Under General International
Law, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 37, 45 (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2005).
177
See id. at 46 (“Where the conduct called into question is not the conduct of the party to a
treaty . . . such an approach which piggy-backs on domestic law and enforcement tends to work
relatively well.”).
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter SUA]. SUA was adopted as a
response to the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985. Pathak, supra note 144, at 75; see also
MURPHY, supra note 149, at 187–88 (describing the attack on the Achille Lauro and the international
response to it).
181
Tuerk, supra note 170, at 347.
182
United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation: Ratification and Accessions by Various Countries, Feb. 19, 1993, 1777 U.N.T.S.
587, 588.
183
United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation: Acceptance by the Netherlands, Mar. 5, 1992, 1721 U.N.T.S. 493, 493.
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have signed this treaty and are bound by its provisions. Currently, 156
states are parties to SUA, and these nations’ vessels account for 94.73% of
the world tonnage on the high seas,185 numbers that indicate the seriousness
in recent years with which the international community has treated the
threat of terrorist acts at sea.
SUA purposely does not define acts of terrorism but instead refers only
to “unlawful acts” because the drafters thought that defining terrorism
would be too difficult.186 It “established extraditable offenses of direct
involvement . . . in the intentional and unlawful threatened, attempted or
actual endangerment of the safe navigation of a ship.”187 Specifically, the
Convention states:
(1) Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully
and intentionally:
...
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on
board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of that ship; or
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its
cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of
that ship . . . .188
Despite the use of the term “suppression” in the title, SUA is primarily
focused on the apprehension, conviction, and punishment of those who
commit such acts, as opposed to the prevention of terrorist acts.189 Also,
SUA refers only to unlawful acts that are committed by “any person” and
therefore excludes offenses committed by governments or state-sponsored
terrorist organizations.190
SUA applies to all vessels that are “navigating or [are] scheduled to
navigate into, through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the
territorial sea of a single State.”191 Therefore, only vessels that are not
scheduled to leave a state’s territorial seas are exempt from the provisions
184
United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation: Ratification by the United States of America, Dec. 6, 1994, 1891 U.N.T.S. 438,
438.
185
International Maritime Organization, Summary of Status of Convention, http://www.imo.org/
conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247 (last visited June 11, 2010).
186
See MURPHY, supra note 149, at 192 (“The drafters, quite sensibly, decided that defining
terrorism was too sensitive, too political and too much of a waste of time to be attempted and therefore
adopted the term ‘unlawful acts’ as an acceptable euphemism.”).
187
Tuerk, supra note 170, at 350.
188
SUA, supra note 180, art. 3(a)–(c).
189
See id. arts. 4–12.
190
See id. art. 3 (referring only to individuals, not governments or state-sponsored terrorist
groups).
191
Id. art. 4.
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of SUA; an attack on these types of vessels would be covered by the
domestic laws of the state in whose territorial seas the vessel was
operating.192
Similar to most anti-terrorism conventions, SUA contains a provision
specifying that a member state which finds an alleged offender in its
territory is obligated to either extradite or prosecute that person.193
However, despite this language, SUA does not impose a strict obligation to
extradite the alleged offender because “the possibility of non-extradition
for political offences as well as the right to grant asylum are
maintained.”194 If no specific extradition treaty exists between the state
that captured the alleged offender and the state which seeks that person’s
extradition, the former state may, “at its option,” consider SUA a legal
basis for the extradition.195 As a result, SUA is weakened because states
may choose not to extradite an alleged terrorist if the two nations do not
already have an extradition treaty in place, rather than rely on the authority
vested by SUA.
Despite the hope that SUA would be an effective solution to the
ambiguity of the piracy laws under UNCLOS, it has largely been futile in
apprehending and prosecuting alleged terrorists. In addition to the
independent obligation to extradite offenders in the absence of a specific
extradition treaty, SUA does not explicitly require a complete jurisdictional
overview; it only requires that the state in whose territory the offender is
found “submit the case . . . to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution.”196 There is no requirement that the state complete
prosecution and punish the individual appropriately. Additionally, SUA is
only as strong as the states’ willingness to enforce it. SUA is intended to
discourage piracy and maritime terrorism, but “it must be used—and be
used properly—if that objective is to be served effectively.”197 If member
nations do not pressure each other to enforce the “extradite or prosecute”
provision of SUA, it will be unsuccessful in combating terrorism.198
Even without a binding treaty that requires member nations to
prosecute terrorists, such as SUA, state action against terrorists can be
justified under international custom.199 Even though it is not often used as
192

Tuerk, supra note 170, at 348.
SUA, supra note 180, art. 10.
194
Tuerk, supra note 170, at 349.
195
SUA, supra note 180, art. 11(2) (emphasis added).
196
Id. art. 10(1).
197
Tiribelli, supra note 148, at 153.
198
In fact, SUA has only been used once to prosecute an alleged offender. In 2002, the United
States government apprehended and charged a Chinese national with violating the provisions of SUA
after he killed two crewmembers aboard a Taiwanese fishing vessel that was operating on the high seas.
The defendant was later convicted on all counts and sentenced to thirty-six years in federal prison.
United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 718–20 (9th Cir. 2008).
199
Samuel P. Menefee, Terrorism at Sea: The Historical Development of an International Legal
Response, in VIOLENCE AT SEA: A REVIEW OF TERRORISM, ACTS OF WAR AND PIRACY, AND
193

2010]

LOVABLE PIRATES?

1519

justification for the prosecution of terrorists, “protecting the lives and
property of one’s nationals against maritime attacks has . . . been accepted
as an international norm.”200 Therefore, no specific treaty need be cited in
order to justify counter-terrorist activity, and a nation that is not a party to
an anti-terrorism international convention is not prohibited from
prosecuting terrorists based on international custom.
The members of Sea Shepherd who engage in destructive actions
against the Japanese whaling vessels clearly fall within the recognized
mentality of marine terrorists. One of Sea Shepherd’s stated goals is to
“expose” what it views as illegal activity by the whaling vessels in the
Southern Ocean.201 The group is trying to garner attention for its cause,
even allowing camera crews to film their exploits for production of a
television show in the United States.202 The group believes that whaling is
morally reprehensible and is trying to pressure the Australian government,
as well as other governments and citizens across the world, to change the
laws and prevent Japanese research whaling.203 Their motivation is both
political and moral.
Sea Shepherd’s activities can also be considered “unlawful acts” as
defined by SUA. Specifically, members of Sea Shepherd have violated
articles 3(1)(c) and (3)(2)(a) in that they have attempted to “cause[]
damage to a ship . . . which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that
ship”204 by attempting to use prop foulers to damage the propellers of the
Japanese whaling ships, which, if successful, would leave the whaling
ships crippled and unable to maneuver, endangering their ability to safely
navigate.205 Also, Sea Shepherd’s ramming of the Japanese whaler Yushin
Maru No. 2206 would be classified as an unlawful act under SUA if there is
evidence that Watson purposely rammed the vessel, thus causing damage
that was likely to affect safe navigation.
Even if Sea Shepherd’s actions in the Southern Ocean were classified
as terrorism or as unlawful acts under SUA, it is unlikely that Australia or
any other nation that witnesses Sea Shepherd’s actions would prosecute
COUNTERMEASURES TO PREVENT TERRORISM 191, 203 (Brian A.H. Parritt ed., 1986).
200
Id.
201
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Who We Are, supra note 87.
202
See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text.
203
Paul Watson stated in a Sea Shepherd press release:
I wish that the Australian government would apply the same “diplomatic”
pressure on Japan to end their illegal whaling operations. . . . The Rudd government
was elected on a promise to take the Japanese whaling industry to court for their
illegal whaling activities. Now they seem to be more interested in taking Sea
Shepherd to court for our efforts to intervene against illegal whaling operations.
Press Release, Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, Australian Federal Police Seize Whale War Videos
(Feb. 20, 2009), available at http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and-media/news-090220-1.html.
204
SUA, supra note 180, art. 3.
205
See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
206
See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
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them under international law for the same reason that they chose not to
prosecute Sea Shepherd as pirates: these nations do not support Japan’s
exploitation of the commercial whaling moratorium. Australia has
consistently refused to bring charges of terrorism against Sea Shepherd,
despite Japan’s pleas that the country intervene.207 The enforcement of
international law, and specifically SUA, relies on the good faith of
domestic courts208 to enforce the laws, and without Australia’s good faith,
it is unlikely that Sea Shepherd will be prosecuted as terrorists by Australia
if other nations do not pressure Australia to do so.
C. International Regulations for Avoiding Collisions at Sea
Australia has received a great deal of criticism from Japan for failing to
take action against Sea Shepherd. However, the group’s vessel, the Steve
Irwin, does not fly the flag of Australia; rather, it is registered in the
Netherlands.209 As the flag state in which the vessel is registered, the
Netherlands has obligations under international law to ensure that the
vessel is operated safely.210 Article 94 of UNCLOS lists several
obligations of the flag state, but the list is understood to be nonexhaustive.211 The Dutch government has an obligation to revoke or
suspend the registration of the Steve Irwin if it finds that Watson and the
officers are operating the vessel in an unsafe way, in violation of
international law.
The International Maritime Organization (“IMO”), of which the
Netherlands has been a member since 1949,212 established rules for the
operation of vessels at sea, commonly referred to as “COLREGS,” by
which all vessels flagged under the member states must abide.213 These
207
For example, Japan protested the Australian government’s decision to return the two
crewmembers who boarded the Japanese whaling vessel to the Steve Irwin rather than pressing charges
of terrorism against them. “The Australian Government helped an eco-terrorist group by providing full
support,” Japan’s Fisheries Agency chief stated. Whalers Angry at ‘Eco-Terror’ on the High Seas,
HERALD SUN (Austl.), Jan. 22, 2008, at 12.
208
Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in
International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 23, 71 (2006); see also supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text (discussing the ineffectiveness
of SUA if member nations are unwilling to enforce its provisions).
209
Andrew Darby, Japan to Smith: Act Against Sea Shepherd, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Sept. 24, 2009, at 4.
210
See UNCLOS, supra note 63, art. 94 (requiring that the flag state ensure that the master and
officers of any vessel flagged in their state observe international regulations concerning safety at sea
and prevention of collisions).
211
Craig H. Allen, Revisiting the Thames Formula: The Evolving Role of the International
Maritime Organization and Its Member States in Implementing the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 10
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 265, 291 (2009).
212
International Maritime Organization, http://www.imo.org/ (last visited June 11, 2009) (select
“Member States”).
213
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, NAVIGATION RULES: INTERNATIONAL—INLAND, at iv (1999).
The United States adopted the regulations into public law in 1977. International Navigational Rules
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-75, 91 Stat. 308 (1977).
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rules were established as part of the Convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea in 1972.214 The main purpose
of the rules, as suggested by the title of the convention, is to prevent
collisions at sea, and the rules are intended to be vigorously enforced in
order to maintain overall safety at sea.215
One of the most important regulations established in COLREGS is the
obligation of the ship’s master under rule 2 to operate the vessel prudently
and in observance of “good seamanship.”216 The rule not only reminds
mariners that they have a legal duty to observe the rules and to apply the
collision regulations, but “it [also] alerts the mariner that the collision
regulations . . . require[] mariners to operate their vessels with the same
care and vigilance that would be exercised by a reasonably prudent and
professional seaman in the same conditions and circumstances.”217
While operating in the vicinity of the Japanese whaling vessels,
Watson violated this regulation when he collided with the whaling vessel
Yushin Maru No. 2 in February 2009.218 During the encounter, Watson
claimed that he was only trying to get close enough to the Japanese vessel
to disrupt the transfer of a dead whale from a harpoon ship to a processing
ship.219 However, even if Watson did not intend to ram the other vessel,
which he has done in the past, in attempting to disrupt its activities, he
maneuvered his own vessel so close to the whaling ship that the vessels
collided. Footage of the collision was captured by cameramen working for
the Discovery network while filming an episode of Whale Wars and clearly
shows the Steve Irwin ramming the whaling vessel from behind, although it
is not clear if it was intentional or accidental.220 Regardless of whether the
collision was an accident, Watson violated rule 2 of COLREGS by not
operating his vessel in a prudent manner because he maneuvered too close
to another vessel to prevent a collision.

214
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459,
1050 U.N.T.S. 16 [hereinafter COLREGS].
215
Robert P. McCleskey, Jr. & Jeremy A. Herschaft, Unique Features of Maritime Collision Law,
79 TUL. L. REV. 1403, 1409–10 (2005).
216
Id. at 1410. The rule specifically states: “Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or
the owner, master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to comply with these Rules or
of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen . . . .”
COLREGS, supra note 214, 28 U.S.T. at 3468, 1050 U.N.T.S. at 22.
217
CRAIG H. ALLEN, FARWELL’S RULES OF THE NAUTICAL ROAD 87 (8th ed. 2005).
218
See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
219
Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, Whaling Opponents Collide at Sea, supra note 106.
220
Animal Planet, Whale Wars: Close Quarters and Collisions, http://animal.discovery.com/
videos/whale-wars-close-quarters-and-collisions.html (last visited June 11, 2010). The video shows the
Steve Irwin, with Watson at the helm, attempting to catch the two Japanese ships in order to stop them
from transferring a dead whale from one to another. At one point, Watson asks for more speed from
his vessel, rather than reducing speed and backing out of the close-quarters situation. The Yushin Maru
No. 2 can be heard blowing the danger signal on the ship’s whistle in an attempt to warn the Steve Irwin
that it is too close.
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Sea Shepherd has violated COLREGS and, in doing so, has violated
international law.
Because of its participation in UNCLOS, the
Netherlands is obligated under article 94 to ensure that vessels flying the
Dutch flag are abiding by international laws to ensure safety at sea and to
enforce its jurisdiction over offending vessels. Japan has exerted pressure
on the Netherlands to withdraw the Steve Irwin’s registration and deem it a
flagless vessel.221 Recently, some Dutch officials have begun to voice
agreement with the Japanese government and are trying to amend Dutch
law so that the Steve Irwin’s registration can be revoked.222
If the Netherlands revoked the Steve Irwin’s registration and no other
nation issued the vessel a registration, it would be deemed a flagless vessel
and would have little protection under international law. Stateless vessels
operating on the high seas are “international pariahs” with no recognized
right to operate freely on the high seas.223 All nations have the right to
exercise jurisdiction over these flagless vessels and can board them at any
time:224 “Jurisdiction exists solely as a consequence of the vessel’s status
as stateless. Such status makes the vessel subject to action by all nations
proscribing certain activities aboard stateless vessels and subjects those
persons aboard to prosecution for violating the proscriptions.”225 If the
Steve Irwin were deemed stateless as a result of the Dutch government’s
revocation of its registration, the Japanese government could board the
vessel in search of evidence of illegal activity any time the vessel operates
on the high seas or in Japanese territorial water.
Australia has recently taken some action against Sea Shepherd,
although it has not resulted in any criminal charges. The Australian
Federal Police executed a search of Sea Shepherd’s ship and seized
documents, video footage, and more than 150 unedited videos as part of an
investigation into the group’s activities.226 The raid took place after Sea
Shepherd returned from a trip to the Southern Ocean to engage the
Japanese whaling fleet.227 The evidence seized, including footage shot by
the Discovery network employees during production of their television
show, could be used by Japan to bring charges against Sea Shepherd,
although no charges have been forthcoming.228

221
See Gov’t Wants Emergency Act Against ‘Environmental Pirates,’ NIS NEWS BULL., June 27,
2009, http://www.nisnews.nl/public/270609_3.htm (reporting that Japan has repeatedly complained to
the Dutch government about Sea Shepherd).
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Id.
223
Monroe Leigh, Judicial Decisions, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 624, 631 (1983).
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Id.
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United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1383 (11th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
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HERALD, Feb. 22, 2009, at 8.
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VI. COMMENTARY
If Sea Shepherd is permitted to continue its actions against the
Japanese whaling fleet without fear of prosecution from the international
community, human lives will be lost in the Southern Ocean. Sea
Shepherd’s actions are extremely dangerous and could be deadly to the
Japanese whalers as well as members of Sea Shepherd.
Sea temperatures in the Southern Ocean regularly fall below thirtythree degrees Fahrenheit.229 If a person were to fall overboard into water
below thirty-three degrees without wearing survival equipment, he would
lose function of his extremities within two minutes and lose the ability to
keep himself afloat by kicking and paddling.230 Death from hypothermia
can occur within fifteen minutes.231 Survival times drop significantly if
there is any kind of wind chill. The rugged environment in which whaling
vessels and Sea Shepherd operate is unforgiving. For example, if Sea
Shepherd successfully obstructed the propeller of one of the whaling ships
and it drifted into an iceberg, puncturing a hole in the vessel’s hull, any
crewmember who abandoned the ship without proper equipment would
almost assuredly perish from hypothermia before aid arrived. Similarly, if
any Sea Shepherd crewmember were to fall overboard, perhaps after losing
his balance while attempting to board a Japanese vessel, he would likely
perish before the ship could execute a recovery maneuver. A Japanese
crewmember was lost at sea and perished in 2009 after falling overboard,
although Japan did not allege that it was the result of Sea Shepherd’s
antics.232 If the international community at large does not act to stop the
battle between Japanese whaling vessels and Sea Shepherd, it is likely that
several lives will be lost in the cold waters of the Antarctic.
Australia and the Netherlands, as well as the United States, are
opposed to the Japanese exploitation of the research loophole that is
written into the IWC. They believe that Japan is carrying out commercial
whaling under the guise of research. Because these countries believe Japan
is violating the spirit of the law, Australia and the Netherlands have
refused to take action against Sea Shepherd. Their refusal can be seen as a
silent protest to the activities of Japan. By idly watching Sea Shepherd
attack the Japanese whaling fleet and endanger the lives of the crew
229

See Matt Rosenberg, The New Fifth Ocean, ABOUT.COM, Aug. 20, 2009, http://geography.
about.com/od/learnabouttheearth/a/fifthocean.htm (observing that the sea temperature of the Southern
Ocean ranges from twenty-eight to fifty degrees Fahrenheit).
230
Whatcom Association of Kayak Enthusiasts, Hypothermia Rates, http://www.wakekayak.org/
content/safety/hypothermia.asp (last visited June 11, 2010).
231
Id.
232
See Andrew Darby & AAP, Japanese Whaler Lost at Sea, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 6,
2009, at 7 (“‘Survival time in waters of zero degrees [Celsius] and a four metre swell is estimated at
one hour.’” (quoting Christ McMillan, spokeswoman for the Maritime New Zealand’s Rescue Coordination Centre)).
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onboard the whaling vessels, however, Australia and the Netherlands are
violating international law and multilateral treaties that require they take
action against unlawful acts at sea.
Japan’s use of the research loophole in the IWC moratorium on
commercial whaling may be disreputable, but it is not illegal. The research
exception allows the member nations to set their own quotas for kills done
for the sake of research and does not specify to what type of research the
exception applies. Even though Japan is not following the spirit of the
IWC’s ban on commercial whaling, it is following the letter of the law and
making use of an oversight in the drafting of the ban. If Australia and
other member nations of the IWC strongly oppose Japan’s research, as they
clearly seem to, the appropriate action is not to ignore attacks made against
these whaling vessels by Sea Shepherd that could potentially cost human
life, but instead to petition the members of the IWC to change the
provisions of the commercial ban and eliminate the research exception to
the ban. Australia and other anti-whaling nations can change the provision
by gaining the necessary votes to pass an amendment. Failing to take
action against Sea Shepherd is not a reasonable response to Japan’s
activities.
There are several mechanisms available to prosecute members of Sea
Shepherd for their actions against the Japanese whalers. The least viable
option would be to prosecute Sea Shepherd crewmembers under UNCLOS
for acts of piracy. Although Belgium successfully prosecuted Greenpeace
for its antics,233 this is the only example of a court finding that an
environmentalist group was acting for “private ends” during its protest of
perceived harmful activities. The commonly recognized meaning of
“private ends” is that the illegal act be done for financial gain, which is not
one of Sea Shepherd’s motivations. It would also be inappropriate to
prosecute Sea Shepherd as pirates when SUA was enacted in part to
prosecute environmental terrorists who are politically motivated and who
traditionally fall outside of the definition of piracy under UNCLOS.234
Both Australia and the Netherlands, however, should take action
against Sea Shepherd because they are obligated to under international law.
Sea Shepherd flies the Dutch flag and, in doing so, is guaranteed certain
protections from the Netherlands. As the flag state, the Netherlands is
required under UNCLOS to ensure that the vessels registered with the
Dutch government are operated safely. If it does not meet this
requirement, the government is obligated to suspend or revoke that
233

See supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text.
See Menefee, The Case of the Castle John, supra note 143, at 16 (“The very absence of
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registration. Paul Watson, as the captain of the Steve Irwin, has shown a
disregard for his own vessel and the Japanese whaling vessels by operating
the ship too close to the whaling vessels to be considered good
seamanship. Watson claims that he no longer intentionally rams whaling
vessels,235 but even if he can be believed, his tactics to place his vessel
between the whales and the whaling ships is equally dangerous. A
collision at sea could be disastrous, regardless of whether it was intentional
or accidental, and if the collision damaged the structure of either vessel and
caused it to take on water, crewmembers would perish if forced to abandon
ship. By continuing to allow the Steve Irwin to fly the flag of the
Netherlands, the Dutch government is affording Sea Shepherd protections
under UNCLOS that it does not deserve because of the unsafe operation of
its vessel. If the Dutch government were to revoke the Steve Irwin’s
registration, the vessel could still operate, but under international law it
would not be protected from searches and seizures by the law enforcement
vessels of any nation when it operates on the high seas. This would
effectively prohibit Sea Shepherd from continuing its antics.
In addition to losing its registration, the officers and crew of the Steve
Irwin should be prosecuted under SUA for unlawful acts committed on the
high seas. SUA was written precisely to deal with these types of activities.
It was created with the intention that it be used by nations to prosecute or
extradite individuals who commit criminal acts on the high seas without
regard to their motivation. SUA specifically did not provide a definition of
terrorism; instead, the drafters intended that acts that might not be
traditionally considered terrorism or piracy would still fall within its
umbrella of jurisdiction. Under the provisions of SUA, nations must either
prosecute or extradite alleged offenders found within their jurisdiction.
This provision was included to force nations to take action rather than be
passive bystanders. Australia’s obligations under SUA are not optional;
the government cannot choose whether to abide by the provisions if
Australia is a member nation to the treaty. If Australia is opposed to the
Japanese whaling activities in the Southern Ocean, the appropriate venue
for action is to petition the IWC to end the research program. Ignoring
violations of international law by individuals who then seek safe harbor in
Australian ports is a clear violation of the state’s obligations under SUA.
Any nation that is a party to SUA may take action against members of
Sea Shepherd that are found within that nation’s jurisdictions. Australia is
criticized by the Japanese government for failing to arrest Sea Shepherd
crewmembers because Sea Shepherd’s vessels frequently pull into
Australian ports to refuel the vessels and take on supplies.236 Nevertheless,
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the Sea Shepherd organization and its members frequent many other
countries. In fact, Sea Shepherd’s international headquarters is located in
Friday Harbor, Washington, near the Canadian border.237 The U.S.
government has the authority and the obligation under SUA to prosecute or
extradite any crew member that travels to the United States after partaking
in illegal activities as defined by SUA in support of the anti-whaling
campaign.238
The endangerment of life at sea is unacceptable, regardless of the
reasons cited for the violence. It is incumbent on Australia, the
Netherlands, and the international community as a whole—including the
United States—to use international mechanisms to stop Sea Shepherd’s
criminal activity in the Southern Ocean.
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